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The correction  of  external  imbalances  in  many developing  countries
during  the  eighties  has  taken  the  form  of  major  cuts  in  investment  rates  rather
than  increases  in domestic  savings.  This  investment  decline,  which  mirrors  the
decline  in  the  external  resource  transfer  since  1982,  has  been  especially  sharp
in the  highly  indebted  countries,  and has been accompanied  by a slowdown  in
growth  in all  LDC's.  Both  public  and private  investment  ratas  have fallen,
although  the  latter  more drastically  than the former. If this trend is
maintained,  it  will lead  to  a slowdown  in  medium  term  growth  possibilities  in
these  economies  and  will reduce  the  levels  of long  run  per  capita  consumption
and  income,  endangering  the  sustainability  of the  adjustment  effort.
The  observed  reduction  in  investment  in  LDC  's seems  to  be the  result
of several  factors.  First,  the lower  availability  of foveign  savings  has  not
been matched by a corresponding  increase  in domestic  savings.  Second,  the
deterioration  of fiscal  conditions  due to the cut in foreign  lending.  to the
rise  in  domestic  interest  rates,  and  to the  acceleration  in inflation  forced  a
contraction  ir  public  investment.  Third,  the  increase  in  macroeconomic
instability  associated  with  the  external  shocks  and  the  difficulties  of  domestic
governments  to stabilize  the  economy  has  hampered  private  investment.  Fourth,
the  debt  overhang  has  also discouraged  investment,  through  its implied  tax  on
future  output and the ensuing credit  constraints  in international  capital
markets.
In this  paper  we review  current  investment  theories,  recent  models
of investment,  behavior  and  empirical  studies  on the  subject  in  order  to examine
the linkages  between  macroeconomic  adjustment  and private  investment. The-2-
review  serves  two  purposes: on the  one  hand,  to  get  a further  understanding  of
the  behavior  of investment  in  LDC's  during  the  eighties.  On the  other  hand,  we
seek to identify  research  areas  relevant  for  the  design  of policies  that  can
bring  about  adjustment  with  growth.
The paper is organized  as follows.  First  we review  in Section  2
different theories  of  investment,  starting from Keynes and covering the
Accelerator,  Neoclassical,  Tobin's  Q,  Disequilibrium,  Two-Gap  and
Irreversibility  theories  of investment.  In  Section  3,  we discuss  the  literature
on macroeconomic  policies  and private investment,  examining  the effect of
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy on private investment,  paying
attention  to  some  economic  or institutional  features  specific  to  LDCs  (e.g.,  the
degree  of intervention  in financial  markets,  the possible  complementarities
between  public  and  private  investment,  or  the  high  reliance  on  imported  capital
goods)  that  may  affect  the  transmission  mechanisms  through  which  some  standard
macropolicy  measures  influence  investment.  In  the  fourth  section  we review  the
recent  literature  on  credibility,  uncertainty  and  irreversibility  in  investment
decisions,  which  is  very  useful  in  order  to understand  the response  of  private
investment  to the change in economic  iricentives  that comes along  with an
adjustment  program.  Because  investment  is  at least  partially  irreversible,  and
because  it is guided  by the uncertain  future  profitability  of capital,  it is
also  extremely  sensitive  to  cconomic  and/or  political  instability.  We discuss
how  such  factors  contribute  to  determine  the  investment  response  to  a given  set
of economic incentives,  which is a key mechanism  for stabilization  to be
followed  by  a resumption  of  growth. Finally,  Section  5  presents  some  concluding
remarks.2.  Investment  Theory:  A Brief  Review
Keynes  was perhaps  the first economist  to call attention  to the
existence  of  an  independent  investment  function  in  the  economy  in  departure  from
the  prevailing  notion  (i.e.,  the  Wicksellian  loan  market)  that all available
saving  is automatically  invested  provided  an appropriate  interest  rate  exists
in  the  economy.  Keynes'  (1936)  basic  insight  was  that  investment  depends  on  the
prospective  marginal  efficiency  of capital relative  to some interest  rate
reflecting  the  opportunity  cost  of the  invested  funds. In  addition,  he  pointed
out the intrinsic  volatility  of private  investment,  due  to the fact  that  any
forecast  of  the  returns  of investment  accruing  in  the  future  will  be  necessarily
incomplete  and  uncertain.  According  to  Keynes,  in  such  an  environment  investors
would  be left  to their  "animal  spirits'  in  making  their  investment  decisions
rather  than  to  a  rational  calculation  of  an  inherently  uncertain  distant  future.
After  Keynes,  the  evolution  of investment  theory  was  linked  to simple
growth  models  in  the  Harrod-Domar  tradition.  This  gave  rise  to  the  accelerator
theory,  popular  in the  fifties  and  early  sixties  and  widely  used  even  today  in
practical  growth  exercises. The accelerator  theory  makes investment  a linear
proportion  of  changes  in  output,  as  derived  from  a fixed  proportions  production
technology.  This  extreme  simplicity  explains  the  popularity  of the  approach:
given  an incremental  capital-output  ratio (ICOR),  it is easy to compute  the
investment  requirements  needed  to  achieve  a  given  output  growth  target. In  this
model,  profitability,  expectations  and  cost  of capital  considerations  play  no
role  in the  determination  of investment.These  overly  restrictive  assumptions  led  Jorgenson  (1967)  and  Hall-
Jorgenson  (1971),  among others, to formulate  the Neoclassical  approach  to
investment.  This  approach  introduces  factor  substitution  in the  derivation  of
the  demand for  capital from the  firm's cost minimization (or profit
maximization)  problem. The desired  capital  stock  is shown  to depend  on the
rental  cost  of  capital  (which  in  turn  depends  on  the  price  of  capital  goods,  the
real  interest  rate  and  the  depreciation  rate)  and  the  level  of  output. Decision
and delivery  lags (or  implicitly  adjustment  costs)  create  a gap between  the
current  and desired  capital  stocks,  giving  rise to an investment  equation,
namely  an equation  for  the  change  in  the  capital  stock.
This approach,  in turn, has been subject to several criticisms
regarding  the consistency,  and plausibility,  of its assumptions:  (i) the
assumptions of  perfect competition and  exogenously given  output  are
inconsistent;  (ii)  the  assumption  of  static  expectations  is  inappropriate,  since
investment  is essentially  a forward  looking  process;  (iii)  delivery  lags  are
introduced  in  an ad  hoc  manner.
An alternative  formulation  of the investment  function  is the *QO
theory  of investment  associated  with  Tobin  (1969). In this  approach  the  ratio
of the  market  value  of the  existing  capital  stock  to its  replacement  cost (the
Q  ratio)  is  the  main force  driving  investment.  Tobin  provided  two  reasons  why
Q  may differ from unity: delivery  lags,  and increasing  marginal  costs of
investment. Abel (1981)  and Hayashi  (1982)  reconcile  the  neoclassical  and  Q
approaches,  by showing  that  the  latter  follows  from  the  firm's  optimal  capital
accumulation  problem  under (convex)  adjustment  costs.  In this setting  what
matters  for  investment  is  marginal  Q,  i.e.,  the ratio  between  the  increase  in- 5  -
the  value  ox  the  firm  due  to  the  installation  of  an  additional  unit  of capital,
and  its  replacement  cost.  However,  marginal  Q is  not  observed;  moreover,  it  will
generally  differ  from  the  observed  average  Q  (-fhich  is  just  the  market  value  of
existing  capital  in terms  of  new capital),  except  under  conditions  of perfect
competition  and  constant  returns  to  scale  (see  Hayashi  (1982)).  They  will  also
differ  if  firms  face  quantity  constraints  in  real  or financial  markets.  In  that
case,  average  Q will not provide  all the relevant  information  for investment
decisions;  the  latter  will also  depend  on the  relevant  quantity  constraints.
The  basic  assumption of  convex installation  costs  is  highly
questionable. While such an assumption  is necessary  to bound the rate of
investment  (so  that  a  meaningful  investment  demand  function  can  be  defined),  it
can  be argued  that  the  cost  of  additions  to an individual  firm's  capital  stock
is likely  to be linear  (or  even concave)  in investment,  due to the 'lumpy'
nature  of  many  investment  projects.  More  importantly,  disinvestment,  if  at  all
possible,  is  much  more  costly  than  positive  investment:  capital  goods  often  are
firm-specific,  and  have  a low  resale  value. An  extreme  but  useful  view  of  this
asymmetry  is  to  consider  investment  completely  irreversible.  In  this  case,  the
adjustment  cost function  is asymmetric  with infinite  adjustment  costs for
negative  investment  rates.  The notion  of irreversible  investment  was first
introduced  by Arrow (1968),  who characterized  the dynamics  of irreversible
investment  under conditions  of certainty.  He showed  that irreversibility
creates  a wedge  between  the  cost of capital  and its  marginal  contribution  to
profits. However,  it is Ander  conditions  of uncertainty  when irreversibility
can  have  important  implications  for  investment  decisions:  as  a  recent  literature
(e.g.,  Bernanke (1983),  McDonald  and Siegel (1986),  Pindyck (1988b,1989),Bertola  (1989))  has  emphasized,  irreversible  investment  can  be  very  negativsly
affected  by risk factors.  The intuitive  reason  is that if the future  is
uncertain  any  addition  to productive  capacity  today  increases  the  probability
that  the  firm  may  find  itself  tomorrow  with 'too  much'  capital,  which  cannot  be
(costlessly)  eliminated  due to the irreversible  nature  of investment;  hence
firms  will  be extremely  cautious  in  their  capacity  expansion  decisions.  As we
shall  discuss  below,  this  suggests  that  uncertainty  may be more relevant  for
investment  decisions  than  other  conventional  variables  such  as interest  rates
or taxes.
In  the  disequilibrium  approach  to  investment  (Halinvaud  (1980,  1982),
Sneesens  (1987)),  investment  is a function  of both profitability  and output
demand  considerations.  In  Halinvaud  (1982),  investment  decisions  are  separated
in  two  btages: the  decision  to  expand  the  level  of  productive  capacity.  and  the
decision  about  the  capital  intensity  of that  additional  capacity. This last
decision  depends  on profitability  variables  like  the  relative  cost  of capital
(including  the  real  interest  rate)  and  labor. On the  other  hand,  the  capacity
decision  depends  on the degree  of capacity  utilization  in the  economy  as an
indicator  of demand  conditions. The distinction  between  both decisions  is
meaningful  due to the assumption  of a putty-clay  technology,  so that factor
proportions  are flexible  ex-ante  but rigid  ex-post. In Sneessens  (1987),  net
investment  is positively  related to the gap between actual  and long run
equilibrium  capacities. This in turn is a reflection  of differences  between
actual  and equilibrium  rates  of capacity  utilization  and between  actual  and
equilibrium  markup  rates. Therefore  investment  depends  both  on profitability
(discrepancies  between actual  and equilibrium  mark-up rates)  and on salesconstraints  (discrepancies  in rates  of capacity  utilization).  The  investment
decision,  in turn,  takes  place  in a setting  in  which  some  firms  may be facing
current  and  expected  future  sales  constraints,  an  important  depdrturn  both  from
the  Neoclassical  (Jorgenson)  and  the  Q  models.
Disequilibrium  models  have  often  been  criticized  due  to  the  simplicity
of their  expectational  assumptions.  However,  market  disequilibrium  and  rational
expectations  are  not  necessarily  inconsistent.  Neary  and  Stiglitz  (1983)  have
shown that rational  expectations  and excess  supply  in the goods and labor
markets  can coexist,  in a context  of forward-looking  agents  that anticipate
future  sales  constraint  in a world of wage and price rigidities  (see  also
Precious (1985)).  This is particularly  relevant  for investment  since the
outcomes  of  decisions  made  today  will  be  observed  in  the  future,  so  expectations
play a crucial  role.  On the  other  hand,  important  problems  of macroeconomic
adjustment,  like  deviations  of output  from  full  capacity  in  the  face  of demand
shocks,  are  associated  with (transitory)  disequilibrium  in  the  goods  and  labor
markets. In such  conditions,  a combination  of expectations  and  disequilibrium
may  be  needed  for  a an adequate  understanding  of investment  behavior.
In  the  developing  countries  context  investment  may  be  subject  to  other
constraints  besides  that  of sales. Rama (1987)  has formulated  and estimat^d
investment  equations in terms of profitability  and  sales and  financing
constraints. At the aggregate  level,  savings  availability  may be limited
because  of a lack  of foreign  savings  in  economies  with a significant  stock  of
outstanding  foreign  debt. Large fiscal  deficits  also reduce  the volume  of
domestic  savings  available  to finance  private  investment.  At the  microi  level
firms  may face  binding  financial  constraints  if quantity  adjustments  rule indomestic  capital  markets.  This  may be the case  because  of the existence  of
controlled  interest  rates  and  also  because  credit  rationing  may  be  a feature  of
the equilibrium  in the loan market,  as demonstrated  by Stiglitz  an,d  Weiss
(1981). Asymmetric  information,  adverse  selection  and incentive  effects  may
make  interest  rite  changes  an inefficient  device  to  sort  out  good  borrowers  from
bad borrowers.  Under those conditions,  credit rationing  and quantitative
constraints  may  become  a  preferred  tool  for  lending  allocation  by  the  creditors.
There  is  a  growing  literature  on  the  effects  of  financial  constraints
on investment  (see  Fazzari Hubbard  and  Petersen  (1988a,  1988b),  Calomiris  and
Hubbard  (1989),  Mayer  (1989),  Mackie-MRson  (1989)).  Its  main  contention  is  that
internal  finance  (retained  profits)  and  external  finance  (bonds,  equity  or  bank
credit)  are  not  perfect  substitutes.  The  discrepancy  in  the  cost  of  different
sources  of financing  is due to asymmetric  information:  lenders  in capital
markets  cannot  evaluate accurately the  quality of  firms,  investment
opportunities,  thus  making  the  cost  of  new  debt  and  equity  differ  substantially
from  the  opportunity  cost  of internal  finance  generated  through  cash  flow  and
retained  earnings. According  to this  view,  investment  will be very sensitive
to financial  factors  such  as  the  availability  of internal  finance  or  the  access
to capital  markets. This  new strand  is clearly  a departure  from  the  perfect
capital  market  approach  were  the  financial  structure  of the  firm  is irrelevant
for  investment  decisions;  in  this  new  setting  :ie  market  value  of  a firm  is  not
independent  of its  financial  structure.
Empirical  research  along  these  lines  has  been  undertaken  for  the  U.S.
by  Fazzari,  Hubbard  and  Petersen  (1988a).  They  test  the  role  of the  financial
structure  of  the firm in the Q,  neoclassical  and accelerator  models of-9-
investment  discriminating  by firm  size. The  general  finding  is that  financial
effects  are important  for inves,ment  in all firms,  but also that consistent
differences  exist across firms regarding  the sensitivity  of investment  to
balan  e sheet  variables  that  measure  liquidity,  depending  upon  their  retained
earnings  policies. An important  macroeconomic  dimension  of these  findings  is
that,  provided  fluctuations  in firms  cash flows  and liquidity  are correlated
with  movements in  aggregate economic activity and  the  business cycle,
n,acroeconomic  instability  may  affect  investment  also  through  financial  channels,
mainly  for  firms  relying  heavily  on internal  (and  external)  finance  .
Another  relevant  feature  of investment  in LDCs is the high import
content  of  capital  goods. This  raises  an important  point  emphasized  in  two-gap
models (Chenery  and Bruno,  1962 and Bacha,  1982),  namely  that the lack of
foreign  exchange  may constitute  a major  constraint  to sustain  high rates  of
investment  and  growth  in  LDCs.  In fact,  in  economies  were domestic  and  foreign
capital  goods  are  highly  complementary  the  lack  of  foreign  resources  to import
machinery  and equipment  will be an impediment  to growth (in  the  medium run
import  substitution  of  capital  goods  and  export  promotion  would  ease  the  foreign
exchange  constraint).  The foreign exchange  constraint  also has  important
implications  (discussed  below) for the impact  of exchange  rate policy on
investment  demand.
3.  Macroeconomic  Policies  and  Private  Investment
In this  section  we examine  the  effects  of  macroeconomic  policies  on
private  investment.  In  particular  we are  interested  in  studying  the  impact  on
investment  of  different  tools  of  monetary,  fiscal  and  exchange  rate  policy  aimed- 10  -
at correcting  unsustainable  macroeconomic  imbalances. The traditional  macro
package  includes  restrictive  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  supplemented  with a
real  devaluation  of the  exchange  rate.  We review  the  most relevant  literature
on  the  macroeconomic  determinants  of  investment,  paying  particular  attention  to
the  transmission  mechanisms  and likely  effects  of different  macro  policies  on
private  investment.
A summary  of the linkages  between  adjustment,  investment  and  growth
appears  in Chart 1  The basic  notion  here is that the correction  of macro
imbalances  and  the  achievement  of  macroeconomic  stability  is  a  prerequisite  for
achieving  sustained  growth. In turn,  a strong  response  of private  investment
to the set of incentives  put in place  by an adjustment  program  is a basic
element  for  the  stabilization  effort  be followed  by sustained  growth.  Chart  2
offers a  schematic view  of  the  transmission  mechanisms through which
macroeconomic  policies  affect  private  investment.  The  first  three  columns  show
the  variables  that influence  the  profitability  of capital  (the  real interest
rate,  the  market  price  of  installed  capital,  and  the  price  of  new  capital  goods)
and  how  they  are  affected  by the  different  macro  policies.  The  fourth  and  fifth
columns  single  out demand  conditions  and real credit  availability  as other
determinants  of investment  that  may be affected  by  macroeconomic  policies.  We
now  turn  to  a  more  detailed  discussion  of these  effects.
3.1.  Monetary  and  fiscal  policy  and  private  investment
Restrictive  monetary  or credit  policies  aimed  at reducing  inflation
and!or  the current  account  deficit  may affect  investment  through  two "price'
channels. One is the  rise  in the  real  cost  of bank  credit,  a major  source  of
investment  financing  in  LDC's. The second  is the  increase  in the  opportunity- 11 -
cost  of retained  earnings,  also  an important  source  of investment  financing  in
most  developing  countries,  due  to  higher  real  interest  rates.  Both  effects  lead
to  an impl'cit  or explicit  (in  the  case  of  organized  equity  markets)  reduction
in the  market  value  of existing  capital  relative  to its  replacement  cost (the
Q ratio  is  expected  to fall  with  a  monetary  contraction),  and  thus  to  a decline
of  investment.  In  repressed  financial  markets,  credit  policy  affects  investment
directly through the stock of credit available  to firms with access to
preferential  interest  rates  and through  interest  rates for firms  operating
through  the  unofficial  money  market  (for  models  of  credit  policy  and  growth  in
financially  repressed  economies  see Van Wijnbergen  (1983a  and 1983b)).  The
institutional  set-up  of the financial  markets in developing  countries is
certainly an  important feature determining  the  impact and  transmission
mechanisms  of  monetary  and  credit  policy  on investment  (an  empirical  analysis
of monetary  stabilization  policies  for  Korea  with  endogenous  dztermination  of
investment  is  provided  by Van  Wijnbergen,  (1982)).
High  fiscal  deficits  also  push  up  interest  rates  and  crowd-out  private
investment.  However,  the  way a fiscal  deficit  is  corrected  also  matters  from
the  viewpoint  of investment.  Different  mixes  of  tax  increases  and/or  spending
reductions  can  be expected  to  have  different  effects  on  private  investment.  In
particular,  due to institutional  and political  rigidities  in the ability  of
governments  to  reduce  current  public  expenditure,  fiscal  adjustment  often  takes
tne form of reduced public investment,  some of whose components  may  be
complementary  with private  investment. In fact,  the  empirical  evidence  from
data  on developing  countries  analyzed  by Blejer  and  Kahn (1984)  indicates  that
public  investment  in infrastructure  is complementary  with private  investment- 12 -
(and  other  types  of public  investment  are  not).  Similarly,  Musalem  (1989)  finds
evidence  of complementarily  between  private  and  public  investment  in a time-
series  study  of investment  in  Mexico.
However,  Balassa (1988)  reports  cross section  statistical  results
showing  that  public  and  private  investment  are  negatively  correlated,  with  a  one
per cent increase  in public  investmer.t  being  associated  with a 0.55 percent
decline  in private investment.  Furthermore  he finds  a negative  correlation
between  the share  of public  investment  in total investment  and the size of
incremental  output-capital  ratios,  arguing  for  a  lower efficiency of  public
investment  relative  to  private  investment.
The  general  issue  is  how  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  affect  total  and
private  investment  and  what are the  more relevant  transmission  mechanisms  at
work. A plausible  mechanism  for  restrictive  demand  policies  to affect  private
investment  is through  the market value of capital.  As recent econometric
evidence  shows  (see  Solimano,1989)  aggregate  investment  profitabiLity  is  L-Lghly
procyclical. Tobin's  Q increases  in upturns  and falls  in downturns-  so we
should  expect  the  market  value  of  capital  to fall  in the  short  run  in  response
to a slowdown  in economic  activity  following  restrictive  demand  policies.
Another  relevant  topic  for  research  in this  area  is the  sensitivity  of private
investment  to cyclical  changes  in activity  levels. Econometric  estimates  of
investment  functions  show, in general,  a strong  response  of investment  to
changes  in output. This  is a puzzling  finding  since  a non-negligible  part  of
output  fluctuations  appear  to  be transitory  (therefore  they  should  not  affect
investment),  and it is costly  to install  capital  (so  adjusting  to transitory
shocks  is also costly).  Then this  excessive  output-  related  variability  of- 13 -
investment  in  the  cycle  remains  largely  unexplained  (see  Blanchard's  discussion
of Shapiro,  (1986)).  However,  myopic  expectations  and  short  investment  horizons
may  be consistent  with  the  observed  large  fluctuations  of investment  associated
with  output  changes.
The initial  downturn  in economic  activity  often associated  with
macroeconomic  adjustment  may also affect  investment  through  its effect  on
expectations.  In  fact,  a  current recession could  form  the  basis  for
wpessimistic"  expectations,  leading  investors  to  postpone  investment  until  the
recovery arrives; this, in turn, may  prevent a  take-off of  investment
(particularly  of projects  with short  gestation  lags)  and delay  the recovery
itself,  and  the  economy  may  get  stuck  in  a low  activity  equilibrium  because  of
insufficient  investment  arising  from  self-fulfilling  pessimism  on the  part of
investors.  How to avoid  such  an outcome  is an important  consideration  in the
design  of restrictive  demand  policies  that  minimize  the potentially  adverse
impact  on investment  and  growth.
3.2.  Exchange  rate  policy  and  private  investment
A  key  element  of  almost  any  adjustment  and  stabilization  plan  seeking
a reduction  in the size of the current  account  deficit  is a combination  of
expenditure  reducing  with expenditure  switching  policies.  The latter  refers
basically  to a real  devaluation. A real depreciation  may affect  investment
through  several  channels:
i)  The profitability  of  investment:  a devaluation  may affect the
profitability  of  investment  th_ough  its  impact  on  the  relative  price  of  capital
in the  economy.  In fact,  Buffie  (1986)  and  Branson  (1986)  show  that  if  capital- 14 -
goods have an  import content then a  devaluation  raises the supply (or
reposition)  price of capital  in terms  of home goods;  ceteris  paribus,  this
effect  ternds  to depress  investment  in the home goods sector.  An empirical
confirmation  of the  presumption  that  a real  depreciation  reduce  investment  (in
the short run)  is provided  by Husalem (1989)  for the case of aggregate
investment  in  Mexico.
In these  models,  investment  is treated  as a composite  good  produced
by combining domestic (i.e.,  construction  or  infrastructure)  and  foreign
components (i.e., machinery and  equipment).  In  this setting, a  teal
depreciation  of the exchange  rate acts as an adverse  supply  shock in the
"production'  of investment  goods.  Branson  (1986)  explicitly  calculates  the
impact  of a devaluation  on  Tobin's  Q in the  home  goods  sector,  concluding  that
profits  fall  (and  along  with them  the  market  value  of  capital)  and  the  cost  of
capital  (and  its  reposition  price)  rises  following  a  real  depreciation.  Solimano
(1989)  finds  a negative  effect  of real devaluations  on investment  in his
empirical  simultaneous  equation  model for Chile;  his results  show that the
economy-wide  Tobin's  Q falls  when the real  exchange  rate rises  because  of a
dominant  reposition  price  effect  following  a  real  dep-eciation  (in  principle  the
market  value  of capital  rises  for  the  traded  goods  sector  after  a devaluation,
but  this  effect  may  be  Loo  small  relative  to  the  reposition  price  effect  and  the
effect  of devaluation  on  the  market  value  of  capital  in  the  home  goods  sector).
The issue  is also reviewed,  conceptually,  by Lizondo  and  Montiel (1988),  who
distinguish  between  investment  in  the  traded  and  non-traded  goods  sectors  in  a
model in which capital is sector-specific. They decompose  the effect  of
devaluation  on profitability  into  three  components:  a) its  impact  on the  cost- 15 -
of capital, b) its  effect  on the  product  wage in  both sectors  (also  examined
by  Van  Wijnbergen  (1986)  and  R'sager  (1984)),  and  c) its  impact  on the  cost  of
imported  intermediate  inputs.  Their  conclusion  is  that  the  net  effect  of  a  real
depreciation  is generally  ambiguous,  since  it  tends  to increase  investment  in
the  traded  goods  sector  and  reduce  it  in the  home  good;  sector.
Another  channel  through  which  devaluation  may  affect  the  profitability
of investment  is the real interest  rate.  Consider  first the case of an
unanticipated  devaluation  (we  dlecuss  below  the  anticipated  devaluation  case),
and  assume  that  inte-est  rates  are  determined  in  domestic  assets  markets  (i.e.,
in  the  money  market). In  this  case  a  devaluation  will  increase  the  price  level
through  its  impact  on the  cost  of imported  intermediate  inputs  and  wages  under
indexation;  if  monetary  policy  does  not fully  accommodate  the increase  in the
price  level,  real  money  balances  will fall  pushing  up the real interest  rate
for  a given  rate  of (expected)  inflation. Thus  devaluation  will depress  the
market  value  of  capital  exerting  an adverse  effect  on investment.  On the  other
hand, if devaluation  was  anticipated  and  if it succeeds in eliminating
devaluation  expectations,  then  it  may  result  in  an investment  expansion,  since
the required  return  on capital  would  tend  to fall  reflecting  the  reduction  in
the anticipated  rate  of depreciation  (whether  this  will be so depends  on the
degree  of  capital  mobility  and  the  import  content  of investment;  see  below).
ii)  Financial  effects  of devaluation:  the  debt  crisis  of the  eighties,
and the  adjustment  policies  adopted  thereafter,  has brought  renewed  attention
to the  effects  of devaluation  on the  real  value  of liabilities  denominated  in
dollars  held  by domestic  firms,  banks  and  financial  intermediaries.- 16 -
In  the  case  of  foreign-indebted  firms  devaluation  automatically  raises
the  burden  of  debt,  hence  reducing  their  net  worth. If  domestic  credit  markets
are imperfect  (as  it is often  the case  in LDCs)  these  firms  may subsequently
have to face  credit  constraints,  or  will  have to  bear  higher  costs  of outside
financing  as  creditors  raise  their  lending  rate  to  compensate  for  the  increased
default risk.  These financial  pressures  will lead directly to  reduced
investment  for  those  highly  indebted  firms  in  risk  of  bankruptcy.  The  increase
in  the  real  value  of  firms'  foreign  debt  also  affects investment  indirectly  due
to its  adverse  impact  on the financial  system. As the  net  worth  of indebted
firms  falls  so  does  the  quality  of domestic  creditors'  portfolios  (i.e.,  banks
and financial  intermediaries).  In fact,  they  may be forced  to reduce  their
exposure  by cutting  their  loans --  or may simply  go bankrupt. The ensuing
tightening  of  credit  markets  may  result  in  a  reduced  supply  of  credit  (or  higher
interest  rates)  even  for  firms  that  had  no foreign  currency  liabilities.  This
tightening  of credit  conditions,  in turn,  discourages  investment  as financing
becomes  more  scarce  or  more  expensive.
The financial  effects  of an unanticipated  devaluation  are sometimes
so significant  that  firms  and/or  financial  intermediaries  have  been  bailed  out
by the  public  sector  to  avoid  an  epidemic  of bankruptcies  that  could  result  in
a  major  economic  crisis  and  lead  to the  failure  of  the  adjustment  package. The
financing  of the  bailout,  however,  may lead  in the  future  to a domestic  debt
overhang,  as the treasury  has to issue  bonds to cever  the foreign  exchange
losses  of commercial  banks  and/or  firms  indebted  in  dollars  terms. The  ensuing
higher  stock  of public  debt  associated  with the  rescue  of indebted  firms  puts
an upward  pressure  on interest  rates,  crowding  out  private  investment.  It is- 17 -
interesting  to  note  the  implicit  trade-off  between  supporting  investment  today
(via  subsidization  of indebted  firms)  versus  investment  tomorrow  (arising  from
the  crowding-out  effect  of public  debt  issued  in  previous  periods).
Empirical  studies  of the financial  effects  of devaluation  and its
Jmpact  on investment  are  scarce;  exceptions  are  Easterly  (1989)  and  Rosensweig
and  Taylor  (1989). Easterly  (1989)  sets  up a Computable  General  Equilibrium
model (CGE)  for  Mexico,  extended  to include  financial  flows  in order  to trace
the  impact  of  a  currency  devaluation  on  investment  (which  is  assumed  to  be  self-
financed  and/or  face  credit  constraints).  In  this  model  a devaluation  is  shown
to result  in a fall  in both GDP and  private  investment,  but  with the latter
contracting  substantially  more than the former. The  main cut in investment
comes  from  corporations,  and is  due  to a sharp  increase  in their  real  foreign
indebtedness. Easterly  reports  that the cash flow  of corporations  declines
substantially  in the  simulations  as  a result  of  capital  losses  on  dollar  debt,
while the replacement  cost of capital  rises  sharply. Rosensweig  and Taylor
(1989)  arrive  to mixed  results  using  a CGE  model  for  Thailand  with endogeious
portfolio  choice.  In their simulations  GDP  increases  following  a  ieal
depreciation,  under the assumption  of a strong  export  response  to relatLve
prices  incentives  and  no capital  losses  from  devaluation.  In  turn,  higher  net
worth  provides  more deposits  to banks,  credit  supply  rises,  and the  interest
rate falls.  The result  is an increase  in investment. However,  in their
simulations  including  capital  losses  on foreign  liabilities  associated  with a
devaluation,  domestic  capital  formation  can  be  crowded  out,  and  the  expansionary
net  exports  effect  may  be offset.- 18 -
iii)  Devaluation,  activity  levels  and  investment:  A third  channel  through
which  devaluation  may  affect  investment  is  provided  by its  effect  on aggregate
demand. This  may  be especially  important  when  firms  face  sales  constraints,  so
that  the  degree  of capacity  utilization  or other  variable  representing  demand
considerations  has a strong  systematic  effect  on investment  (sucn  effect  is
often found  empirically;  see e.L. Musalem (1989)  and Solimano  (1989)).  If
devaluation  reduces  aggregate  demand  ex-ante,  then  ex-post  investment  will  fall.
Moreover,  if  investment  has  a  significant  import  content,  then  output  expansion
is likely  to be a  necessary  (but  not sufficient)  condition  for  investment  not
to fall ex-post.  The literature  on contractionary  devaluation  (Krugman  and
Taylor,  1978;  Van  Wijnbergen,  1986;  Edwards,  1987;  Serven,  1986;  Solimano,  1986;
Lizondo  and  Montiel,  1989)  emphasizes  the  slow  working  of substitution  effects
arising from devaluation;  hence in the short run the impact of a  real
devaluation  on  aggregate  demand  is  dominated  by its  adverse  income  effects.  The
latter  operate  through  two  main  channels: one  arises  form  the  likely  initial
trade  imbalance,  which results  in a real  income  transfer  to the rest  of the
world (even  at given  terms  of trade);  the  other  from the  negative  impact  on
consumption  of real  income  redistribution  from  wages  to  profits. On the  supply
side,  three  transmission  mechanisms  may  contribute  to output  contraction:  the
increased  real  cost (in  terms  of domestic  goods)  of imported  inputs,  the  rise
of working  capital  costs,  and real  wage resistance. If the net effect  of a
currency  devaluation  is contractionary,  i.e.,  GDP falls,  then the slump in
economic  activity  is likely  to form  the  basis  for  investors  to cut investment
spending  --  unless  they  clearly  perceive  the  slump  to  be transitory.  However,
with  sufficiently  strong substitution  effects (e.g., a  large impact of- 19 -
devaluation  on  exports)  an expansionary  outcome  will  result,  and  so  devaluation
may raise real income  and stimulate  investment  spending  as the degree  of
capacity  utilization  increases.
The  discussion  until  now  has  focused  on  devaluation  without  making  any
explicit  distinction  between  anticipated  and unanticipated  devaluation. An
anticipated  devaluation  can  affect  investment  through  two  additional  channels:
the  real  interest  rate  and  the  import  content  of capital  goods.
iv)  The real interest  rate channel:  The effect  of an anticipated
devaluation  on interest  rates depends  crucially  or.  the degree of capital
mobility  (that  is,  the  costs  of  portfolio adjustment) and  on  the
substitut'bility  between  domestic  and foreign  assets.  Let us consider  the
general  case of imperfect  capital  mobility  and imperfect  substitutability
between  domestic  and  foreign  assets.  In this  context,  asset  market  equilibrium
makes the  domestic  real interest  an increasing  function  of the foreign  real
interest  rate  plus  the  expected  rate  of  depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate.
Hence  the  perception  by  the  public  that  the  real  exchange  rate  is  overvalued  and
a  real depreciation  is imminent  will lead to higher  real interest  rates  and
reduced  investment;  in  addition,  this  effect  will  be  more important  the  higher
the  degree  of substitutability  (and  also  of  capital  mobility)  between  domestic
equity and foreign assets. However,  under conditions  of  imperfect  asset
substitutability  or restricted  capital  mobility,  it is also possible  that
investors  will shift  their  portfolios  towards  imported  capital  goods in the
expectation  of a devaluation.  Let  us explore this case now.
v)  The speculative  hoarding  effect  of imported  capital  Aoods:  The
anticipation  of  a  real  devaluation  may  also  have  a  positive  effect  on  investment- 20 -
demand, when  capital goods have a  significant  import content, before a
devaluation  actually  takes place.  The mechanism  that could produce this
outburst  of investment  is  the  speculative  hoarding  effect,  which  would  increase
the  purchases  of  imported  capital  goods  in  anticipation  of  a future  devaluation
that  would raise  the  replacement  cost  of investment.  As argued  by Dornbusch
(1984),  the  more  plausible  dynamics  is  the  following:  firms  and  importers  will
attempt  to  increase  their  purchases  of foreign  capital  goods  when  a  devaluation
is expected  in order  to collect  the anticipated  capital  gain;  then,  when the
devaluation  actually occurs and  the  implicit subsidy embodied in  the
overvaluation  is eliminated,  a  sharp cut in investment  may follow.  The
speculative  hoarding  of foreign  capital  goods  may give way to a period  of
depressed investment  after the devaluation,  as  the over-accumulation  is
reversed. (A  similar  time  pattern  would  emerge  in  the  case  of  transitory  trade
liberalization,  when the  latter  includes  a temporary  reduction  of tariffs  on
imported  capital  goods.) Obviously,  a crucial  assumption  for  this  pattern  to
emerge  is  that  of imperfect  capital  mobility  and/or  imperfect  substitutability
between  domestic  equity  and foreign  assets,  a requirement  which  in principle
seems  quite  realistic  for  most  LDCs.  A close  study  of the  observed  dynamics  of
imports of  investment  goods during devaluation  episodes is worth  to be
undertaken,  if we want to learn  more on the dynamics  of investment  (and  the
current  account)  during  an adjustment  program.- 21 -
4.  The  incentive structure  and  investment  response:  credibility,
uncertainty  and  irreversibility
A key ingredient  of most macroeconomic  adjustment  packages  is a
change  in economic  incentives  that switches  spending  towards  domestic  goods
(offsetting  the  deflationary  bias  of the  usual  monetary  and fiscal  restraint)
and  raises  profitability  in the  tradable  sector. This  change  in  incentives  is
expected  to lead  to an outburst  of investment  in the tradable  goods  sector,
increasing  productive  capacity  and enhancing  economic  growth --  and thus
ensuring  the  sustainability  of the  adjustment  effort.
In practice,  however,  the  investment  response  often  is  unexpectedly
weak, and involves long delays.  This poses major difficulties  for the
adjustment  effort,  since  in  the  absence  of an investment  expansion  the  short-
run  deflationary  consequences  of the expenditure-restraining  measures  may be
magnified,  leading  to a  persistent  reduction  in  growth. In this  way,  the  lack
of an adequate  investment  response  in the tradable  sector  to the change  in
economic  incentives  increases  the  cost  of  the  adjustment  in  terms  of  employment
and growth; ultimately,  it may  render the stabilization  effort socially
unacceptable  and  thus  unsustainable.
Therefore  it  is  essential  to  improve  our  understaniing  of the  reasons
that  underlie  this  slow  reaction  of investment,  in  order  to improve  our  ability
to design  sustainable  adjustment  policies. In the theoretical  framework  of
symmetric  convex adjustment  costs to  investment,  this inertia could be
explained  by a combination  of high  adjustment  costs  with sluggish  expectations
on the part of investors. However,  the assumption  that firms  face rapidly
increasing  marginal costs to  capacity  expansion appears questionable  on- 22 -
empirical  grounds,  and there is also no clear justification  for a myopic
expectational  behavior  by investors. A more satisfactory  explanation  can be
offered  by emphasizing  the  importance  of risk  factors  in investment  decisions,
which  would  make investors  reluctant  to  undertake  fixed  investment  projects  in
a context  of high uncertainty  about  the future  economic  environment  and, in
particular,  about  the  future  incentive  structure.
Chart 3 provides  a schematic  illustration  of the implications  of
uncertainty  for  asset  decisions.  When there  is uncertainty  about  the  economic
environment  or about the permanence  of economic incentives,  irreversible
decisions  will  be delayed  to avoid  long  lasting  mistakes.  In particular,  fixed
investment  decisions  will be  postponed,  with the corresponding  negative
consequences  for  growth,  in favor  of  more  flexible  positions  in  liquid  assets.
Among  these,  capital  flight  will  be  a  preferred  option  whenever  there  are  major
doubts  about  the  sufficiency  or the  sustainability  of the  adjustment  effort.
4.1  Irreversibility,  uncertainty,  and  investment 1
As an emerging  literature  has emphasized  (see Pindyck,  1989) for
references),  the key  role of uncertainty  in investment  decisions  follows
directly  from  the irreversible  nature  of  most investment  expenditures.  These
can be viewed  as sunk costs,  because  capital,  once installed,  is firm- or
industry-specific  and  cannot  be put  to productive  use  in a different  activity
(at  least  without  incurring  a substantial  cost). The  decision  to  undertake  an
irreversible  investment  in  an  uncertain  environment  can  be viewed  as involving
the exercising  of an option  --  the option  to wait for  new information  that
I  The  material  in this  section  is largely  based  on Pindyck  (1989).- 23 -
might affect  the desirability  or timing  of the investment. Thus, the lost
value  of this option  must be considered  as part of the opportunity  cost of
investment  --  an issue  which is overlooked  in the conventional  net present
value  calculations  (which  would therefore  underestimate  the opportunity  cost
and overestimate  investment).  As recent  studies  have shown,  this  opportunity
cost  can  be substantial,  and  is  also  very  sensitive  to  the  prevailing  degree  of
uncertai,aty  about  the  economic  conditions  that  determine  the  future  returns  to
the investment. As a consequence,  changes  in uncertainty  can have a very
strong  impact  on  aggregate  investment;  irom  a  policy  perspective,  the  stability
and predictability  of the incentive  structure  and the macroeconomic  policy
environment  may be much  more important  than  tax  incentives  or interest  rates.
In other  words,  if uncertainty  over  the  economic  environment  is  high,  tax  and
related  incentives  may  have  to  be very  large  to  have  any  significant  impact  on
investment.
It is  important  to  note  that  this  effect  of  unicertainty  is  completely
independent  of investors'  risk preferences  or of the extent  to which their
risks  may  be diversifiable.  Investors  may  be risk-neutral  (as  assumed  by  most
of the irreversibility  literature)  and their  risks  completely  diversifiable;
yet investment  would  continue  to  depend  negatively  on the  perceived  degree  of
uncertainty.  The latter  becomes important  here simply  because the fixed
investment  decision  cannot  be 'undone'  (at  least  at  zero  cost)  if  future  events
turn  out  to  be  unfavorable.  In  general,  there  will  be  a  value  to  waiting  (i.e.
an opportunity  cost to investing  today  rather  than  waiting  for  information  to
arrive)  whenever  the investment  is irreversible  and its net payoff  evolves
stochastically  over  time.- 24 -
From a  macroeconomic  perspective,  there are different forms of
uncertainty  which may be relevant  for investment  decisions.  Consider  for
example  the  investment  decision  of  a  firm  facing  uncertain  future  demand,  which
has been analyzed  by Pindyck (1988b)  and Bertola  (1989).  If investment  is
irreversible,  then  some  of the  firms'  installed  capacity  may  go unutilized  if
demand  turns  out to be low.  Ex-ante,  this  will  make firms  want to  hold less
capacity  than  they  would  under  conditions  of reversibility.  Mtoreover,  Pindyck
and  Bertola  also show  that  increased  demand  volatility  will generally  lead  to
reduced  investment,  by worsening  the 'worst  case'  scenario  in which  the firm
regrets  the irreversible  capacity  expansion  (it  also  makes  the 'high  demand'
scenario  better,  but  this  can  be  taken  care  of  by installing  additional  capital
if needed, i.e. the adjustment  cost function  is asymmetric). The firm's
optimal  investment  rule  equates  the  expected  discounted  value  of profits  from
the marginal  unit of capital  to the installation  cost plus the 'value  of
waiting'  lost  by undertaking  the  capacity  expansion.
The  case  of uncertain  real  exchange  rates  has  been studied  by Dixit
(1987),  Krugman (1988),  and Krugman and Baldwin (1987),  who consider  the
behavior  of a firm  who must decide  whether  to enter (or  exit) the foreign
market.  They show  that sunk  entry  costs  combined  with uncertain  future  real
exchange  rates  will cause  firms  not to enter  the  market  even  though  favorable
exchange  rate movements  would seem to make entry profitable.  Similarly,
Caballero  and Corbo (1988)  show that uncertainty  over future  real exchange
ra.es  can depress  exports.  Dornbusch  (1988)  examines  the related  issue  of
capital  flight  reversal  following  a real  depreciation;  he argues  that  in order
to attract  the  previously  evaded  capital  to irreversible  fixed  investment,  an- 25  -
over-depreciation  of the exchange rate may be needed, to compensate  the
uncertainty  faced  by investors  with a frontloading  of the  returns  to investing
in  the  domestic  country.
Ingersoll and  Ross  (1988) examine the  ro'e of  interest rate
uncertainty  in a context  of irreversible  investment  where  future  returns  are
known  with  certainty  (see  also  Tornell,  l988). As  with  uncertainty  over  future
cash  flows,  this  creates  an  opportunity  cost  for  investing.  They  conclude  that
the  effect  of interest  rate  variability  on the  optimal  timing  of investment  may
be quite  sizeable;  moreover,  they  show  that  a fall  in  expected  future  interest
rates  need  not  lead  to increased  investment.  The  reason  is that  such  a change
also lovers the cost of waiting, and thus can have ambiguous  effects on
investment.  In  other  words,  interest  rate  volatility  may  be  more important  for
investment  than  interest  rate  levels.
The relevance  of these  results  for  macroeconomic  policy,  especially
in  developing  countries,  cannot  be overemphasized.  Consider,  for  example,  the
problem  of relative  price  volatility. Many developing  countries  suffer  from
high and  unpredictable  inflation,  which is usually  matched  by high relative
price variability.  The irreversibility  approach  suggests  that this would
reduce  the  effectiveness  of relative  price  zhanges  in stimulating  investment.
Specifically,  a  history  of frequent  relative  price  swings  would  make investors
extremely cautious in  reacting to  a  policy-induced  change in  sectoral
incentives;  substantial  time  may  elapse  before  investors  become  convinced  that
the  change  is  permanent  --  and  before  they  are  willing  to give  up their  option
to postpone  investment.  Notice  also  that  the  implementation  of an adjustment
package  may  well  increase  uncertainty  in  the  short  run,  as  private  agents  start- 26 -
receiving  mixed  incentive  signals  --  some  associated  with the  previous  policy
rules, some with the stabilization  package,  and some with the structural
reforms  aimed  at restoring  medium  term  growth. An exampie  along  these  lines  is
provided  by van Wijnbergen  (1985),  who shows  that a trade reform  which is
suspected  to be only  temporary  can  in fact  lead  to a fall  in investment  --  as
economic  agents  postpone  investment  in  both  the  home  and  traded  goods  sectors
in  order  to receive  additional  information.
The debt overhang  faced  by many high-indebted  countries  creates  a
similar  problem,  which  has  been  emphasized  by Sachr  (1988). It  arises  from  the
need to carry out an external  transfer  to the country's  creditors,  and
represents  another  source  of instability  of the  macroeconomic  environment:  in
a  context  of  uncertainty,  the  level  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and/or  the  demand
management policies consistent  with  the  required transfer also  become
uncertain;  the size  of the  transfer  itself  is  not  known  with certainty,  as it
depends  on uncontrollable  factors  such  as the future  level  of world interest
rates  and the terms  of trade.  Carrying  out the transfer  may require  future
real  exchange  rate  changes,  fiscal  contraction,  or both.  Thus investors  must
face the risk of large swings  in relative  prices, taxation,  or aggregate
demand;  as  we saw  above,  each  of them would  lead  to reduced  investment.
In  practice,  this  effect  may  be  hard  to  identify,  since  foreign  debt
may  affect  investment  adversely  through  two  additional  channels  (emphasized  by
Borenzstein  (1989)).  First,  the debt overhang,  which acts as an anticipated
foreign  tax  on current  and future  income:  since  part  of the future  return  on
any  investment  will  accrue  to  the  creditors  as  bigger  debt  service  payments,  it
discourages  capital  accumulation  and promotes  capital flights.  Second,  the- 27 -
credit  rationing  effect:  a highly  indebted  country  is likely  to face c.redit
constraints  in international  capital  markets,  which is equivalent  to facing
higher  real  interest  rates,  and  this  will  also  discourage  investment.
4.2  The  role  of credibility
From  a  policy perspective,  an  extremely important source of
uncertainty  is the imperfect  credibility  of policy  reforms.  The latter  is
related  to the  public's  perceptions  about  both  the  internal  consistency  of the
adjustment  program  and the government's  willingness  to carry  out  the program
despite  its  implied  social  costs. Unless  investors  view  the  adjustment  program
as fully  credible  in  both senses,  the  possibility  of a future  policy  reversal
will become  a key determinant  of the investment  response.  As argued  by
Dornbusch  (1988),  any  adjustment  program  can  be undone  by reverting  economic
policies  --  while  investors  cannot  undo  their  fixed  capital  decisions.  In  such
conditions,  the value of waiting  arises  from the losses (the 'irreversible
mistake',  in Bernanke's  (1983)  terminology)  that investors  would incur if
policy  were in  fact  reversed  in  the  future. Clearly,  the  larger  the  perceived
probability  of a future  policy  reversal,  the  less  willing  investors  will  be to
undertake  fixed  investment  projects  --  or the larger  the current  return  they
will require  in order to compensate  for the possibility  of an irreversible
mistake.
This implies  that any  given  set  of policy  measures  can have  widely
different effects on  investment  depanding on  the prevailing degree of
'confidence'  of the public.  In particular,  stabilization  may entail  large
social and economic  costs if credibility  is low --  since the investment- 28 -
response  will be insufficient  to offset  the deflationary  bias of the usual
fiscal and moDnetary  restraint  measures;  thus, a persistent  recession  may
develop  before  investors  become  confident  enough  that  the  adjustment  measures
will  be  maintained.  This  may  be  particularly  relevant  in  economies  with  a  past
history  of frequent  policy swings  or failed  stabilization  attempts  --  two
features  shared  by many highly  indebted  countries  --  in which the private
sector  has learned  to  view  adjustment  programs  with  considerable  skepticism.
Hence  setting the  right  economic incentives is  a  required
precondition  for investment  and  growth,  but it does  not guarantee  that they
will in fact  take  place  (Dornbusch,  (1989)).  Obviously,  high  credibility  would
help  speed  up the investment  response  and  reduce  the  costs  of the  adjustment.
However,  the  question  of  how  can  credibility  be affected  by  government  actions
remains  largely  unresolved.  Specifically,  an  important  issue  here  is  the  choice
between  gradual  and abrupt  stabilization. The former  would set initially
modest  objectives,  which  can  be achieved  with  near  certainty,  in  order  to  build
up the  government's  reputation.  The  latter  would  start  with an  overadjustment
(e.g.,  an over-depreciation  of the  exchange  rate)  to frontload  the  incentives
to resource  reallocation  (but  also  the  costs  of  the  adjustment).  As argued  by
Edwards  (1988),  the  choice  may  largely  depend  on  the  specifics  of  each  country;
the  social  distribution  of adjustment  costs  implicit  in the  program,  together
with  past  policy  experience,  are  likely  to  be important  issues  here.
It is important  to emphasize  that  policy  reversal  is an endogenous
outcome  in this framework,  since  current  private  sector  decisions  affect  the
opportunity  set of  future policy actions and  ultimately  determine the
sustainability  of the adjustment  policy. As an example,  consider  again  the- 29 -
case  of a large  real  depreciation  that  due  to low  confidence  fails  to attract
investment  to the tradable  sector.  Its only visible effects will be a
deflationary  real income cut and an income redistribution  from labor to
capital, especially in  the  traded goods  sector; however, because the
depreciation  is  not sufficient  to compensate  for  the  lack  of credibility,  the
increased  profits  will be reflected  in increased  capital flight.  Social
pressure  and  balance  of  payments  problems  may  eventually  force  policy  reversal,
thus  confirming  the  initial  skepticism  of investors.
The alternative  situation  starts  with high  confidence,  which  allows
an investment  boom and validates  the adjustment  program.  In both cases
expectations  may  be self-fulfilling,  which  reflects  the  possibility  of  multiple
equilibria  in this framework  --  an indeterminacy  that also arises  in the
literature  on investment  under  monopolistic  competition  (see e.g. Kiyotaki
(1988),  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1989)). In this  case,  it is due  to the  presence
of an externality  that  creates  a  wedge  between  the  social  and  private  returns
to investment:  higher  aggregate  investment  helps  sustain  the  adjustment  effort
and  therefore  results  in  higher  returns  to investment,  a  mechanism  that  will  be
ignored  by the  individual  investor.  Since  the  'high  confidence'  equilibrium  is
clearly  better  in a meaningful  sense  than its alternative,  it is crucial  to
investigate  what  specific policy measures  (e.g., additional temporary
investment  incentives)  can  lead  the  economy  to  this  superior  outcome.  As argued
by Dornbusch  (1989),  sufficient  external  support  to the stabilization  effort
may  play  an  important role  by  raising investors' confidence in  the
sustainability  of  the  adjustment,  thus  giving  way to the  investment  takeoff.- 30 -
4.3  Empirical  applications
The empirical  literature  on uncertainty  and irreversibility  still
remains  very scarce.  A  simple  nonstructural  approach  is used by Pindyck
(1986),  who  tests  for  the  effects  of  uncertainty  by  introducing  the  variance  of
stock returns as  an  explanatory  variable in  an  otherwise conventional
investment  equation;  his results  with aggregate  U.S. data indicate  that the
variance  of stock returns is an important  factor for investment  growth.
Solimano  (1989)  also investigates  the effects  of economic  instability  in an
empirical  simultaneous  equation  model applied to Chile. He finds that the
volatility  of the real  exchange  rate  and  output  exert  a significant  negative
impact  on private investment,  and argues that the large swings in both
variables  in Chile during  the eighties  may have resulted  in a substantial
reduction  in private  investment  as compared  to a counterfactual  scenario  of
lower  relative  price  and output  variability.  Dailami  and Walton (1989)  also
argue  that  macroeconomic  instability  may  be one  major  cause  of low  investment
in  Zimbabwe.
A  different  approach  is  used  by Bizer  and  Sichel  (1988),  who develop
a structural  model  of  capital  accumulation  with  asymmetric  costs  of  adjustment;
in their framework,  irreversibility  would imply  higher  downward  adjustment
costs  than  upward  ones. Their  preliminary  results  using  industry  data  for  the
U.S. manufacturing  sector are somewhat  mixed, perhaps due to aggregation
problems.  More  work  along  these  lines,  perhaps  using  a  cross-section  of  country
data,  should  be a research  priority. However,  it should  be noted  that  sample
variances (or other sample measures of  variability)  represent imperfect
measures  of  risk;  in  particular,  they  cannot  c&pture  the 'peso-problem'  type  of- 31  -
uncertainty  associated  with the  possibility  of a regime  change  (e.g..  a policy
reversal),  which  may be very  hard to  measure  empirically.  Moreover,  the role
of irreversibility  may be masked  in aggregate  data;  as Bertola  (1989)  points
out, the irreversibility  constraint  is probably  much more relevant  at the
disaggregated  level.
Simulation  models  provide  an alternative  way  to  assess  the  practical
importance  of  irreversibility. Rough numerical  calculations  reported  by
several  authors suggest  that it may be very large  indeed  for 'reasonable'
parameter  values. The  development  of a structural  simulatior.  model  should  be
another  priority  in  the  research  agenda. Such  a  model,  parameterized  to fit  a
particular  country  or industry,  could  be  very  useful  to  evaluate  the  impact  on
investment  of policy  changes  and  of changes  in specific  forms  of uncertainty.
In  particular,  it  could  be  uted  to  analyze  explicitly  the  effects  of  perceived
possible  shifts  in the  policy  regime  --  i.e.,  credibility  changes.- 32 -
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5.  Concluding  Remarks
In this paper  we have reviewed  the linkages  between  macroeconomic
adjustment  and  private  investment.  From  the  policy  viewpoint,  there  are  three
broad areas  relevant for  research. The  first concerns the  effects of
macroeconomic  adjustment  policies  on private investment.  There are some
institutional  or economic  features  shared  by many LDCs th&t  may modify  in a
substantial  mannet  the  transmission  mechanisms  through  which  fiscal,  monetary,
and exchange  rate  adjustment  affect  investment  decisions. To advance  in the
design  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  policies  that  minimize  the  adverse  short-
term impact  on investment,  we need to know more about  the implications  for
private investment  of fiscal  adjustment  (and especially  public investment
reductions), of  monetary  restraint under  alternative financial market
arrangements,  and  of  exchange  rate  changes.
The  second  research  area  concerns  the  implications  of  irreversibility
and  uncertainty.  A more  complete  understanding  of their  effects  on investment
decisions  is a  crucial  prerequisite  for  the  design  of adjustment  programs  that
;.t.xroduce  credible  incentives  for the expansion  of investment,  leading  to a
resumption  of growth and making the adjustment  effort sustainable.  The
development  of models suitable for  the empirical study of  irreversible
investment  under  uncertainty  should  be a top  priority  in the  research  agenda.
More  work is  also  needed  on the  investment  consequences  of policy  credibility,
as  well  as on the  policy  implications  of the  investment  externality  introduced
by the  credibility/sustainability  link.
The third research  area is concerned  with the links between  the
reduction  in the transfer  of external  resources  and the drop in investment- 37 -
observed  in  many  LDCs. A further  understanding  of the  transmission  mechariams
at  work  and  the  related  policy  implications  are  clearly  very relevant  areas  for
policy  oriented  research  in the field  of macroeconomic  adjustment  and  private
investment.- 38 -
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